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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we address the problem of data recon-
struction from privacy-protected templates, based on recent
concept of sparse ternary coding with ambiguization (STCA).
The STCA is a generalization of randomization techniques
which includes random projections, lossy quantization, and
addition of ambiguization noise to satisfy the privacy-utility
trade-off requirements. The theoretical privacy-preserving
properties of STCA have been validated on synthetic data.
However, the applicability of STCA to real data and po-
tential threats linked to reconstruction based on recent deep
reconstruction algorithms are still open problems. Our results
demonstrate that STCA still achieves the claimed theoretical
performance when facing deep reconstruction attacks for the
synthetic i.i.d. data, while for real images special measures
are required to guarantee proper protection of the templates.
Index Terms— Privacy, template protection, reconstruc-
tion, ambiguization, deep learning.
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern machine learning is based on the usage of massive
data sets that often contain privacy-sensitive information. A
similar problem exists with biometrics that are used in both
private security systems granting access to various devices
and services, and public security systems covering various
surveillance and monitoring applications. In recent years, the
advancement of personalized medicine applications also re-
quires reliable privacy protection of genetic data and privacy
sensitive clinical records. Despite the broad variety of these
applications, machine learning tools are more often used to
extract templates from the data that by itself does not guar-
antee their privacy protection against reconstruction attacks.
At the same time, it is demonstrated that the original data can
be reliably reconstructed from templates and non-linear rep-
resentations extracted by both hand-crafted methods based on
local descriptors [1] and deep representations [2]. Once suc-
cessfully reconstructed, an adversary might use these data to
impair both privacy and security in the above applications.
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The problem of template privacy protection in view of re-
construction attacks is well recognized and various generic
methods were proposed such as fuzzy commitment schemes
[3] and secure sketches [4], helper data based methods [5,
6], concealable template protection and robust hashing [7]
as well as several practical methods in biometrics applica-
tions [2]. We do not pretend to be exhaustive in our overview
and refer interesting readers to [8]. Recently, a concept of
the STCA was proposed that combines and extends the en-
coding and randomization principles from the information-
theoretic perspectives [9–11]. The STCA ensures the protec-
tion of both templates and queries in authentication and iden-
tification systems against the adversarial reconstruction and
clustering [9, 10]. In contrast to binary templates, the STCA
is based on sparse ternary encoding [12] of data ensuring the
maximum information preservation for the authorized users,
while minimizing the leakages for unauthorized users using a
special ambiguization scheme based on an addition of noise to
the zero components of ternary codes that do not contain any
significant information. The authorized users benefit from the
presence of degraded authentic data in a form of probe allow-
ing the reliable reconstruction of the original features with a
minimum loss of information. Thus, the STCA enables the
verification and identification in the original space in contrast
to the binarized templates, which face the loss of information,
and yet enjoying fast search and optimal performance [9–11].
To the best of our knowledge, the STCA was not investi-
gated under the deep adversarial reconstruction. Furthermore,
the methods of template reconstruction based on the deep ma-
chine learning techniques considered in [1] and [2] were not
investigated under the advanced privacy-preserving methods.
Therefore, the goal of this paper is to make one step forward
and consider the generalized reconstruction from the STCA
protected data under adversarial deep reconstruction attacks.
Along this way, we target to practically confirm the achiev-
ability of theoretical limits based on previously reported re-
sults [9, 10]. For this purpose, we will use synthetic data
and analytically treatable feature extraction methods from one
side and real data from another one. The adversarial attacks
will be investigated in two settings of reconstruction from the
protected template with all ‘known model parameters’ besides
the randomization noise, that will be kept secret for the at-
tacker, and ‘unknown model parameters’.
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Fig. 1: General block diagram explaining the adversarial reconstruction of xˆ based on publicly available privacy protected
template ua based on the STCA applied to the template y extracted from x using an extractor φθ(·).
Notations: X and X denote random variables and ran-
dom vectors, while their realizations are denoted as x and x,
respectively.
Paper Organization: The problem formulation is given in
Section 2. The reconstruction under the known model param-
eters is addressed in Section 3 and under the unknown param-
eters in Section 4. Section 5 presents the experimental results
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a signal x ∈ Xn, whereX ⊂ R. A generic template
extraction scheme is denoted as:
y = φθ(x), (1)
where φθ(x)=σL(WL...σ1(W1x)) denotes any function in
the form of a deep network parametrized by some learnable
parameters θ={W1, · · ·,WL}with a set of element-wise non-
linearities σl(·), 1 ≤ l ≤ L, such as VGG 19 [13], AlexNet
[14], etc. Furthermore, the template y can also be raw data,
extracted features using any known hand crafted methods, ag-
gregated local descriptors based on BoW, FV, VLAD [15–17].
Note that we do not impose any constraints on the sparsity of
x in the direct domain or some transform domain.
In this work, we will focus on a simple model φθ(x) =
Wx to investigate the capacity of machine learning meth-
ods versus analytical closed-form solutions for reconstruction
attacks against protected templates. Our setup is explained
by the need to investigate the security of template protection
rather than template extraction since the reconstruction from
various features and templates is known to be successful ac-
cording to [1, 2].
As privacy protection, we consider a generic privacy-
preserving encoding based on random projections, quantiza-
tion and addition of random noise that is integrated in the
STCA framework [9, 10]:
ua = ϕ(Ay)⊕ nsupp, (2)
where A is a random m× d matrix, ϕ(·) : R → {−1, 0,+1}
is a quantization operator representing an element-wise non-
linearity and nsupp denotes the ambiguization noise that
can be added to the orthogonal complement of space of
ϕ(Ay). The sparse ternary representation u = ϕ(Ay) ∈
{−1, 0,+1}m has Sx non-zero components, i.e., ‖u‖0 = Sx,
and protected templateua has Sx+Sns non-zero components,
where 0≤Sns≤m−Sx is the sparsity level of ambiguization
noise for the public representations. Note that A may reduce,
keep or extend the dimension of the vector y, i.e.,m T d. The
clean representation u will be used for adversarial training.
In this paper, our purpose is to evaluate practically the
privacy-protection capacity of STCA based template protec-
tion by utilizing machine learning reconstruction tools. The
general block diagram of our framework is depicted in Fig. 1.
We investigate both synthetic and real data in our study. We
consider two attacking scenarios assuming that: (a) ϕ(·), A
and W are known to the attacker and nsupp is unknown and
(b) ϕ(·), A, W , nsupp are unknown to the attacker. The goal
of the attacker is to reconstruct xˆ as close as possible to x
based on the protected template ua.
3. RECONSTRUCTION UNDER THE KNOWN
MODEL PARAMETERS
In the most general case, the reconstruction under the known
models (1) and (2) can be formulated as:
xˆ = arg min
x
1
2
||ua − ϕ(Aφθ(x))||22 + λΩ(x), (3)
where ||.||2 denotes a `2-norm,λ is a regularization parameter
and λΩ(x)=−log p(x). Unfortunately, it is not feasible to de-
fine a multidimensional pdf p(x) in practice besides some rare
exceptions of i.i.d. models and the models capturing sparsity.
To ensure privacy protection against adversarial recon-
struction, we separate the impact of the imposed non-linearity
by the network φθ(·) on the extracted templates, from the
STCA template protection capacity. Accordingly, we consider
the network φθ(x) =Wx with a constraint WTW = I , that
yields:
xˆ = arg min
x
1
2
||ua − ϕ(AWx)||22 + λΩ(x). (4)
In the general case, assuming that ϕ(·) is differentiable
with respect to x, one can find the solution to (4) as:
x← x− η∇xJ(x), (5)
by denoting J(x) = 12 ||ua−ϕ(AWx)||22+λΩ(x). However,
the solution of (4) based on (5) faces several practical prob-
lems that we summarize below.
Problem 1 (the non-differentiability of ϕ(·)): The STCA
ternarization operator ϕ(·) is not differentiable with respect
to x. Therefore, one can envision several approaches to ap-
proximate ϕ(·) by some differentiable surrogate function, as
for example by a hard-thresholding operator that preserves the
same mutual information as for the ternarization operator for
a range of sparsity levels Sx [18], or by considering a linear
approximation, i.e., ϕ(AWx) = AWx, that yields to:
xˆ = arg min
x
1
2
||ua −AWx||22 + λΩ(x), (6)
with Ω(x) = ||x||22. In this case, the solution reduces to:
xˆ = ((AW )TAW + λI)−1(AW )Tua. (7)
Problem 2 (model prior for real data): The above as-
sumed `2-norm regularizer works only for the synthetic i.i.d
Gaussian data. In the case of real images, it is too restric-
tive. The class of sparsification priors is also relatively re-
strictive in view of a single overcomplete shallow representa-
tion. Instead, recent works [19, 20] suggested using a genera-
tive model x = gθG(z), where gθG(·) is a generator of GAN
or decoder of VAE trained on corresponding data {xi}Ni=1,
whereN denotes the number of training samples. In this case,
the reconstruction problem reduces to:
zˆ = arg min
z
1
2
||ua − ϕ(AWgθG(z))||22 + λΩ(z), (8)
and xˆ = gθG(zˆ) under the differentiability or surrogate re-
placement of non-differentiable ϕ(·).
4. RECONSTRUCTION UNDER THE UNKNOWN
MODEL PARAMETERS
The adversarial reconstruction under the model with unknown
parameters is of more practical interest. Instead of assuming
the complete knowledge of the model and its differentiability,
the adversary has access to the training data {xj ,uj}Mj=1 or
can use the model u = ϕ(Ay) as a black box for the given
inputs {xj}Mj=1 to compute the templates {uj}Mj=1.
The recovery problem reduces to the training of a recon-
struction deep network fψ(u):
ψ∗ = arg min
ψ
1
M
M∑
j=1
L(fψ(uj),xj). (9)
The trained reconstruction network represents a deep decoder
that is applied directly to a privacy-protected template ua by
producing the recovered image xˆ =fψ∗(ua). One can also
envision a setup of training on protected templates ua with
different ambiguization levels of u that is out of the scope of
this paper.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The privacy protection power of STCA originates from the
lossy ternary quantization induced by ϕ(·) and the addition
of the ambiguization noise nsupp to the support complement
of sparse ternary approximation. Clearly, the imposed lossy
ternarization has an impact on both the authorized and unau-
thorized users that prevents the perfect recovery of x. We
can measure how much information is lost and how much
is preserved, in the terms of distortion level and encoding
rate. Moreover, we can link it to the classical Shannon rate-
distortion theory. The intelligently designed ambiguization
scheme proposed by the STCA ensures accurate reconstruc-
tion for the authorized users while prohibits an accurate re-
construction for the unauthorized users. This originates from
the fact that the authorized users can estimate the correct sup-
port of the data using their noisy data x + z, while the unau-
thorized users have no knowledge to “unlock” the protected
template.
Consequently, we will investigate: (a) the link to the
rate-distortion function, (b) the reconstruction based on the
pseudo-inverse (7) and (c) the reconstruction based on the
trained network (9). To evaluate the achievability of theo-
retical limits, we will first validate our results on synthetic
data and then extend them to real images. As the synthetic
data, we used i.i.d. Gaussian samples X ∼ N (0, σ2XIn) and
mappers Ai,j ∼ N (0, 1/
√
n) and DCT transform as W . As
the real images, we have used MNIST data set. Although, this
dataset is relatively simple however it is very useful to assess
the quality of reconstruction in terms of unique recognition
of digits by human thus avoiding any subjective factors of
quality evaluation. The mappers A and W are the same as for
the synthetic data.
We present three series of tests: (i) the theoretical limits
of reconstruction from the STC representations in terms of
achieving the Shannon lower bound on rate-distortion [21] is
investigated in Figures 2a and 2b, (ii) the capability of adver-
sary to reconstruct from the protected templates ua with dif-
ferent levels of sparsity is depicted in Figures 2c and 2d and
(iii) the accuracy of reconstruction from the protected tem-
plates for authorized users with access to the noisy data is
shown in Figures 2e and 2f.
All results are shown for the reconstruction based on the
pseudo-inverse (7) with λ=0 and two types of deep recon-
struction networks. The reconstruction network (9) for the
synthetic data consists of: Linear(529)→Tanh→ Reshape2D
→ Conv2D (channels=32, kernel=7) → ReLu → Conv2D
(channels=16, kernel=5)→Tanh→Conv2D (channels=8, ker-
nel=3)→ ReLu→ Conv2D (channels=1, kernel=3)→ Tanh.
The reconstruction network for the real data consists of: Lin-
ear(784)→ ReLu→ Reshape2D→ Conv2D (channels=32,
kernel=5) → ReLu → Conv2D(channels=16, kernel=5) →
ReLu→Conv2D (channels=1, kernel=5)→ReLu.
The obtained results demonstrate that the pseudo-inverse
reconstruction and deep net reconstruction for the i.i.d. syn-
thetic data have very similar performance while for the real
data the deep reconstruction benefits from the presence of
structured training data and produces perceptually more
pleasant results as shown in Figure 3. The pseudo-inverse
reconstruction does not use data priors and the produced
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Fig. 2: Comparison of Rate-Distortion behavior on the syn-
thetic and real data sets. (a), (c), (e): comparison of pseudo-
inverse and CNN reconstructions on synthetic data set. (b),
(d), (f): comparison of pseudo-inverse and deep reconstruc-
tions on MNIST data set. (a), (b): R(D) curve limits. (c),
(d): R(D) curve for unauthorized users with different am-
biguization levels. (e), (f): R(D) curve for authorized users
with different sparsity levels Sy and considering noisy mea-
surement x+ z, such that σ2Z = 0.25σ
2
X .
results are quite noisy.
It is interesting to note that both types of reconstruction
strategies approach the Shannon limit on the synthetic data
for the rates less than log2 3 = 1.585, which is the maximum
achievable rate by the ternary encoding used in the STCA.
This behaviour is depicted in Fig. 2a. However, the pseudo-
inverse reconstruction produces the results closer to the Shan-
non lower bound. This can be explained that the encoding
matrix is well defined and known while in the case of CNN
reconstruction the inverse mapping is learned from the train-
ing i.i.d data only.
The ambiguization has a strong influence on the adversary
reconstruction ability according to Fig. 2c and Fig. 2d that is
clearly reflected by the increase of reconstruction distortion
with the increase of the ambiguiszation Sns . However, in the
case of real data, the structure in the data makes it possible
for the unauthorized user to reconstruct from the protected
template as shown in Fig. 2d. Several examples of the com-
parison between the pseudo-inverse reconstruction and those
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Comparison of deep and pseudo-inverse reconstruc-
tions on MNIST images. (a): Sx=50, Sns =25, (b): Sx=50,
Sns=100. First column of each panel corresponds to the orig-
inal data, second and third ones correspond to reconstructed
data based on deep network and pseudo-inverse, respectively.
based on the trained network are shown in Fig. 3. As ex-
pected, increasing the ambiguization makes the recognition
more difficult and sometimes ambiguous (Fig. 3b). In prac-
tice, one should find the correct ambiguization factor to a par-
ticular type of data. Finally, the authorized user can unlock
the ambiguization and approach the theoretical limit in con-
trast to the adversary (Fig. 2c, 2d) as shown in Figures 2e and
2f. This confirms the main research hypothesis in the paper.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We studied the capability of STCA for privacy-protection
data release. The validates shown that for synthetic data, the
STCA provides the theoretically achievable limits under both
known and unknown model based adversarial reconstruction.
Moreover, neglection of the ternarization non-linearity and
usage of a simple pseudo-inverse does not lead to any drop in
performance in comparison to deep non-linear reconstruction.
An interesting point is that the deep reconstruction algorithm
does not benefit from i.i.d data in comparison to simple pro-
jection matrix knowledge used in the pseudo-inverse.
The analysis on the real images established that the dif-
ference between the accuracy of reconstruction produced by
the linear pseudo-inverse and deep reconstruction is signifi-
cant besides the fact that the pseudo-inverse uses priors about
the models of template extraction and template protection and
deep reconstruction is based solely on the training data. We
consider two major factors that impact this difference: (i)
the fact that the linear pseudo-inverse does not use any prior
about the statistics of images while the deep reconstruction
can learn data manifold implicitly from the training data, (ii)
the non-linear deep reconstruction also overcomes the prob-
lem of differentiability of the ternarization operator while the
linear pseudo-inverse used in this paper uses the linear ap-
proximation. We believe that these factors should be covered
in future research. In particular, the lack of reliably image pri-
ors can be addressed by the generative model in the formula-
tion (8) under the linear ternarization approximation and com-
pared with the solution based on (9). An additional research
problem to be addressed is an adversarial training (9), when
the various ambiguizations ua should replace the clean ver-
sion u similarly to the denoising auto-encoder training [22].
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